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Abstract—This paper incorporates, as part of an attacker-de-
fender (AD) model for an electric power transmission grid, an
inventory of “recovery spares” for high-voltage transformers
(HVTs). In this sequential-game model, an attacker rst uses
limited resources to disable grid components, seeking to maximize
second-stage “total cost.” This value corresponds to a defender
who operates the damaged grid to minimize generating and
economic load-shedding costs. The defender’s problem includes
1) optimal power-ow solutions to represent post-attack opera-
tions, 2) optimized replacement of disabled HVTs with quickly
installable recovery spares, and 3) longer-term replacements
using new procurements. Global Benders decomposition, with a
mixed-integer subproblem, solves the ADmodel; new enumerative
techniques help solve the decomposition’s master problem and
subproblems. Computational tests demonstrate tradeoffs between
the number of recovery spares and worst-case total cost, and show
how the model could help guide an inventory strategy for recovery
spares in an adversarial setting.
Index Terms—Power system modeling, restoration and protec-
tion, security, substations, transformers.
I. INTRODUCTION
H IGH-VOLTAGE transformers (HVTs) are key compo-nents in any electric power transmission grid. Electric
power utilities do maintain spare transformers to protect power
delivery against rare, age-related failures, but those spares could
fail to protect against the simultaneous loss of multiple HVTs by
the adversarial acts of terrorism or sabotage [1]. This paper de-
velops a model to help guide an inventory strategy for special
“recovery spares,” which could supply the missing protection.
A report by the Congressional Research Service [2] points
out why spare HVTs, beyond current inventories, are needed to
protect against adversarial acts: 1) current inventories are small,
because they are intended to protect against uncommon, random
failures of equipment with large capital costs, 2) existing spares
are often installed adjacent to operating HVTs in a substation,
so an attack on a substation would likely destroy both spare and
operating HVTs, and 3) long procurement times for replace-
ments mean that the simultaneous loss of multiple HVTs from a
coordinated attack on several substations could result in months
of severely degraded service and substantial economic losses.
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Considering these points, and the fact that HVTs are difcult to
transport because ofweight and size, a committee of theNational
Academy of Sciences recommended the following: “[D]evelop
and stockpile a family of easily transported high-voltage re-
covery transformers and other key equipment” [3]. In fact, at the
time of that recommendation, the Department of Homeland Se-
curity had already funded a prototype, truck-mounted recovery
spare for the common 345–138 kV HVTs [1].
Given the adversarial setting, this paper develops a game-the-
oretic interdiction model and associated solution methods to
evaluate how an inventory of recovery HVTs can reduce the dis-
ruption caused by a worst-case, coordinated attack. Disruption
means increased “total cost,” as dened below.
We note that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission has
also addressed the adversarial problem with the Spare Trans-
former Equipment Program (STEP) [4]. Utilities that join the
program may be required to acquire an inventory of spare HVTs
[5]. Naturally, the idea is to share an economic burden in pursuit
of a common benet. (NERC’s 2011 Spare Equipment Data-
base (SED) Program [6] is also relevant.) Tests in Section V
follow the STEP criteria, which support transmission HVTs in
eight voltage classes, with high-side ratings up to 500 kV and
low-side ratings down to 69 kV.
The threat of attacks on electric power substations motivates
the development of a recovery-transformer program in the
United States. But, an inventory of recovery HVTs could also
help improve the resilience of a power grid in the face of natural
disasters such as hurricanes; see [1] and the references therein.
This is true because, similar to a coordinated attack, a natural
disaster can cause the simultaneous loss of multiple HVTs. A
detailed discussion of deliberate attacks and random disasters
exceeds the scope of the current paper, but a short Appendix
outlines how our methods extend to handle both.
II. BACKGROUND: ATTACKER-DEFENDER MODELS
An attacker-defender (AD) model is a two-stage sequential
game that models 1) an intelligent attacker who rst uses
his limited resources to carry out a coordinated attack on the
components of a given system, and 2) a defender who then
operates the damaged system as best possible. An AD model
can help identify a worst-case coordinated attack for a variety
of infrastructure systems [7]. In the current paper, the attacker
represents a terrorist group, while the defender represents the
electric power utility company or companies associated with a
grid, along with that grid’s independent system operator. The
model applies the following conservative assumptions to avoid
the need to model terrorists’ intentions and their ability to
gather intelligence: the attacker knows the defender’s optimal
reaction to any coordinated attack, and will use that knowledge
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to maximize the defender’s post-attack total cost. Total cost
measures, over a given time horizon, all generating costs
plus the economic cost of any load shedding. Without loss of
generality, we ignore direct equipment replacement costs for
the defender and, because achieving normal functionality may
require many weeks or months after an attack, we also ignore
short-term cascading outages.
Salmeron et al. [8] rst describe and demonstrate an AD
model for an electric transmission grid. This may be viewed as
a type of network-interdiction model (e.g., [9]) that evaluates
post-attack cost for the “network user” by solving a set of DC op-
timal powerow (OPF)models,which are linear programs (LPs)
[10, p. 514]. TheADmodel is solved only heuristically in [8], but
then in [11] the same authors develop global Benders decompo-
sition (GLBD) to solve large-scale problems to optimality. (The
algorithm does require onemodeling assumption for correctness
in anACpower grid, but extensive numerical tests on large-scale
models nd no violations of this assumption.) Additional work
in this area includesmixed-integer programming (MIP) versions
of the ADmodel (e.g., [12]–[14]), as well as component-ranking
heuristics (e.g., [15]–[17]). We also see connections between
the current paper’s model and 1) models for optimal, resource-
constrained recovery of a damaged transmission grid [18], and
2) ADmodels that use line switching for better recovery of such
a grid after an attack [19], [20]. The defender’s model in case 2)
becomes a MIP as it does here.
To date, no optimizing AD model for a power grid has incor-
porated spare parts such as recovery HVTs (although Romero
et al. [21] use heuristics in a related context). Rather, a xed
replacement (“repair”) time is assumed for each piece of at-
tack-disabled equipment, or repairs are irrelevant because only
immediate, post-attack-but-pre-repair operations are modeled.
Fixed replacement times are unrealistic, however, if one dis-
abled HVT may be replaced quickly with a recovery spare,
while a limited inventory of such spares means that another dis-
abled HVTmust wait for months for replacement through a new
procurement. Assuming a deterministic replacement time in the
latter case is reasonable, but note that this still involves a deci-
sion variable if the option exists to install a spare.
Adding a limited spare-parts inventory to the AD model
makes the model much more difcult to solve, because the
defender’s problem now involves discrete decisions, not just
the continuous ones from OPF LPs. Also, the model no longer
separates by the time periods induced by component-replace-
ment times. Despite these difculties, we will show how to
extend GLBD to incorporate the new defender’s model, and
show that GLBD can solve realistically sized problems.
The reader should note that our AD model only provides
a tool for comparing different investment strategies for HVT
recovery spares. That is, it makes no attempt to optimize a
strategy directly. Identifying an optimal strategy would require
denition and solution of a defender-attacker-defender (DAD)
model [22], [23], in which the current paper’s AD model could
be viewed as a submodel. Solving a full-scale DAD model in
this context exceeds our current computational capabilities. The
number of potentially useful spare HVTs is small in our tests,
however, so appropriate inventory levels could be identied by
solving the AD model a modest number of times with varying
inventory data. (See Section V.)
III. ATTACKER-DEFENDER MODEL
A. Multi-Period Optimal Power Flow With Recovery HVTs
We rst model the optimal functioning and restoration of an
electrical power grid following a given coordinated attack. Let
the vector denote a xed interdiction plan (also attack plan
or simply attack), where if grid component is inter-
dicted, and , otherwise. Grid component corresponds to
line, transformer, bus, generator or even a substation, which is
itself a collection of other types of components. We assume that
an interdicted component is disabled but, eventually, will be re-
paired or replaced.
The model OPF-T , presented below, extends OPF
from [11] to include installation of recovery spares for HVTs.
Both the extended and original models approximate the op-
timal operation of a power grid after an attack using a set of
DC optimal power ow models. (Wood and Wollenberg [10,
p. 278] support the use of a DC model for “security analysis
studies”; see also [22, p. 6].) For notational simplicity, we omit
the details required to handle three features that our implemen-
tation does allow: 1) substations, 2) DC lines, and 3) customer
classes. Salmeron et al. [11] show how to incorporate these
and, in fact, all computational tests in the current paper do in-
corporate 1).
Indices and index sets:
buses, with as the reference bus;
generators; those connected to bus are ;
AC transmission lines (includes transformers);
HVTs for which a potential spare exists;
origin and destination buses, respectively, for
;
transformer types with “limited spares” (see Note
1);
specic HVT type for ;
time periods induced by component-replacement
times (see further details below and also [11]);
system components; .
Note 1: For modeling purposes, these situations are equiv-
alent: No (recovery) spares are available but a new pro-
curement can replace any damaged HVT at time period , and
unlimited spares are available and can replace any damaged
HVT at time . By contrast, limited spares implies an in-
ventory that can replace some HVTs at time , with the
remainder replaced by new procurements at time .
Data [units]:
generating cost for generator [$/MWh];
load-shedding cost at bus in period [$/MWh]
(Note: in computational
tests.);
maximum output from generator [MW];
thermal capacity of line [MW];
series susceptance of line ;
load at bus during period [MW];
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number of spares of type available;
large constant for line , e.g., [MW];
1 if component is attacked in , and 0 otherwise;
later, denotes attacker-controlled variables.
Subsets and additional data (all given attack ):
time periods when generator is available;
time periods when line is surely unavailable;
time periods when HVT is available, but
only if replaced by a spare;
time periods when line is surely available; note
that for ;
duration of period [hours].
Variables [units]:
phase angle at bus during period [radians];
power ow on AC line during period [MW];
generation from generator during period [MW];
load shed at bus during period [MW];
1 if a recovery transformer replaces interdicted
transformer , and 0 otherwise.















Note 2: All units above are converted into per-unit values for
a base power of 100 MVA.
The objective function (1) minimizes total cost over the
time horizon dened through . Constraints (2) are linearized
admittance constraints for lines during time periods after
an attack in which these lines are surely available (never in-
terdicted, or interdicted but now repaired without the use of a
recovery spare); constraints (3) are corresponding power-ow
limits. Constraints (4) and (5) govern admittance and power
during time periods when an interdicted HVTmight be replaced
by a recovery spare. (If the transformer is interdicted but not
replaced by a spare, linearized admittance constraints (4) are
“switched out,” while constraints (5) force power-handling
capacity to 0.) Constraints (6) force power ow on a line to 0
during time periods after an attack in which that line has no
chance of functioning. (Note that the corresponding admittance
constraints (2) are removed during these time periods, also.
Specically, compare “ ” applied to constraints (6) and
“ ” applied to constraints (2)). Constraints (7) balance
power at the buses. Constraints (8) and (9) set the maximum
output for each generator given that generator’s availability,
which depends on . Constraints (10) ensure that load-shedding
does not exceed demand. Constraint (11) sets the phase angle
on the reference bus to 0. Constraints (12) and (13) limit
the available recovery spares and establish decision-variable
domains.
B. AD Model
To create a complete AD model, we posit an attacker who
seeks to maximize the defender’s minimized, post-attack, total
cost. The minimization includes the assignment of available
recovery spares to replace interdicted HVTs. A complete
“power-ow interdiction model” (PFI) can then be stated.
Additional denitions:
resource required to interdict component ;
total interdiction resource available;
(logical
constraints on the attacker’s actions can be
added [12]);
is maximal for ;
feasible assignments of spares (recovery HVTs)
given interdiction plan ; see constraints (12)
and (13);
feasible given and ;
optimal power ow given and
(Note: need not be optimal for .);
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The Appendix to this paper shows how to extend PFI to handle
damage caused by probabilistically modeled natural disasters in
addition to damage caused by a coordinated attack.
C. Algorithm 1: Global Benders Decomposition (GLBD)
GLBD as described in [11] will solve PFI. This algorithm
resembles standard Benders decomposition, but does not require
that be concave in continuous . We present the algorithm




a. Select as a feasible, coordinated attack.
b. Let ,
and let be the optimality tolerance.
Step 1. Solve the subproblem OPF-T in iteration :
Solve OPF-T , and compute and
master-problem “cut” coefcients following
Assumption 1, below.
If , let and .
If , go to Step 3.
Step 2. Solve the master problem MP in iteration :
(18)
(19)
Let denote the solution and let .
Let and .
If , go to Step 3, else go to Step 1.
Step 3. Print solution:
Print “The -optimal solution is”, .
End.
GLBD converges if 1) is discrete and is nite, 2) can
be computed correctly for any , and 3)
for all . We obtain valid cuts (19) under
the following assumption, veried in [8].
Assumption 1: Given optimal response
to interdiction plan , the following denitions for are
valid: 1) If , then (total energy ow through
component implied by ) , where is the
system’s maximum load-shedding cost, and is the system’s
minimum generating cost; and 2) if , then .
We require the defender to respond optimally to an attack in
the AD model, so it is natural for Assumption 1 to ask for an
optimal assignment of spares. That is too restrictive, however:
Assumption 2: Given , a feasible assignment of recovery
spares and the corresponding power ow
, let and dene as is de-
ned in Assumption 1, but with respect to rather than .
Then, the following inequality is valid for MP :
(20)
The “approximate cut” (20) may not be as tight as (19), but it
can be used to advantage, as described below.
IV. COMPUTATIONAL IMPROVEMENTS
This section explains how the decomposition approach of Al-
gorithm 1 can be modied for potentially faster solutions.
A. Algorithm 2: Approximate Subproblem Solutions by
Truncated Branch-and-Bound
Algorithm 2 tries to spend less time solving the subproblem
OPF-T by truncating the branch-and-bound solution proce-
dure (B&B) if proves to be “sufciently poor”:
Algorithm 2
Proceed as in Algorithm 1, but with these modications:
In Step 0, also dene , with (e.g., ).
In Step 1, while solving OPF-T by B&B, if a feasible solu-
tion is found with (i.e., is a
sufciently poor interdiction plan), stop B&B, and,
a. Add a solution-elimination constraint (SEC) to eliminate
. (See [11] and [24].)
b. Go to Step 2, but add the inequality (20) based on rather
than a standard cut (19).
Algorithm 2 may accept a feasible power ow based on a
non-optimal assignment of recovery spares. Assumption 2 lets
us apply an approximate cut (20) in this case, but then an SEC
must be added to ensure that does not repeat. Actually, SECs
alone sufce for convergence, but we nd that approximate cuts
do accelerate convergence, in practice.
B. Algorithm 3: Enumeration to Solve All Subproblems
The number of recovery spares is likely to be small, so we
may be able to solve the mixed-integer subproblem OPF-T
by enumerating assignments of spares to replace disabled HVTs.
This method’s advantage is that a set of “simple,” easy-to-solve
LPs results from a xed assignment . By contrast, B&B ap-
plied to OPF-T must solve a sequence of large LPs, each
linking the simple LPs through constraints (12).
Algorithm 3
Modify Algorithm 1 as follows: In Step 1, for each ,
solve the restricted version of OPF-T with , and se-
lect the best restricted solution as the solution to OPF-T .
C. Algorithm 4: Enumeration to Screen Subproblems
Solving OPF-T through enumeration of may
become computationally prohibitive for large problems, but we
can exploit “truncated enumeration” in a screening process that
resembles the truncated B&B of Algorithm 2:
Algorithm 4
Proceed as in Algorithm 1, but with these modications:
In Step 0, also dene , (e.g., ).
Replace Step 1 with the following:
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a. Compute , the number of maximal spares assign-
ments given , and let .
b. Identify that is maximal with respect to and let
.
c. Given xed , solve OPF-T for .
Let denote the solution’s objective value.
d. If ,
Add a solution-elimination constraint to eliminate .
Go to Step 2, but apply (20) rather than (19).
e. Set .
f. If , go to Step 1b.
g. Solve OPF-T by B&B.
The parameter reects the computational effort we are
willing to spend to determine that is non-optimal. If that
level of effort is reached, the enumeration is halted, and B&B
solves the subproblem exactly.
D. Algorithm 5: Solving Master Problems by Enumeration
Assumptions 1 and 2 imply that an optimal interdiction plan
will bemaximal with respect to the interdiction-resource con-
straint, that is, . When is modest, an enumerative
method may solve MP more efciently than B&B can. Let
denote the (maximal) master-problem solu-
tions in the order generated, and dene
(21)
Given for all and given a new cut (20) in itera-




Thus, MP can be solved by making only cut-value
calculations. For example, consider a model instance with this
simple attack-resource constraint: “choose ve targets to strike
out of 100.” In this case and, if we
store as a simple array, the total number of additions and
comparisons to compute may not exceed , a modest
number.
Algorithm 5
Proceed as in Algorithm 4, with this modication: in Step 2,
solve MP using enumeration; see (22) and (23).
V. COMPUTATIONAL RESULTS
A. Test Cases and Algorithms
We test variants of GLBD for solving PFI on 1) “RTS,” the
IEEE Two-Area 1996 Reliability Test System (see [25] and
[26]), and on 2) “USRG,” a realistic test system based on data
for a “U.S. Regional Grid,” derived from a reliability council
at NERC. Tests in [8] and [11] use the same basic datasets; we
use them here because an interested reader could reproduce
our work using the RTS data, and because tests on the larger
TABLE I
SUMMARY OF TEST CASES
TABLE II
SUMMARY OF ALGORITHMS BY TEST CASE
USRG dataset help demonstrate the computational capabilities
and limitations of our methods. We also note that [14], [19],
and [20] test interdiction models using the RTS data.
RTS has only one transformer type, a 230–138 kV HVT. A
total of ten are distributed across four substations, with at most
four HVTs in any substation. We assume that any disabled HVT
may be replaced by a recovery spare, if one is available.
USRG has over 500 substations, with up to 15 HVTs in each;
it also has 70 different HVT types. To simplify, we follow the
STEP criteria [4], and model recovery spares only for HVTs
having low-side ratings of at least 69 kV and high-side ratings of
at most 500 kV. (No HTVs in USRG exceed the latter criterion.)
Four transformer types t these criteria, although we omit one
type which occurs in only ve, low-capacity substations: these
substations are “invulnerable to attack” for purposes of testing.
A recovery HVTmust have the same voltage ratings as the HVT
it replaces. USRG also has about 500 small HVTs with low-side
ratings below 69 kV. For simplicity, we assume that these are re-
placeable quicklywith newprocurements, in unlimitednumbers.
Table I summarizes the data and special assumptions for all
test cases. General assumptions follow those in [11]. Note that
generators cannot be attacked, and all planning horizons are
720 h, meaning that any interdicted component in the relevant
system could be repaired or replaced by that time.
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TABLE III
COMPUTATIONAL RESULTS FOR RTS GRID
For simplicity, tests on RTS assume that the load at each bus
is xed at the peak value specied in bus-data table in [26].
In USRG, a three-segment load-duration curve approximates
time-varying demand at each of about 3000 demand buses.
Table II summarizes GLBD and its variants, lists the combi-
nations of algorithm and dataset that are tested, and indicates
why certain tests are omitted.
B. Implementation
We implement all algorithms using, primarily, Xpress 7.4
[27], and run all tests on a Lenovo W520 computer with 16
GB of RAM and two Intel Core i7 processors running at 2.5
GHz. Branch-and-bound solutions of OPF-T use Xpress’s
MIP solver, with a Newton barrier algorithm applied at the root
node. When full or partial enumeration applies to OPF-T ,
Xpress solves the rst OPF model with the Newton barrier algo-
rithm, but solves subsequent OPFs using the dual simplex algo-
rithm and exploiting advanced starting bases. Xpress manages
its own multi-thread strategy. For Algorithms 1–4, Xpress gen-
erates the master problems, but CPLEX 12.3 [28] solves them
using four parallel threads. (Solution times increase with more
than four threads.) Algorithm 5 is coded entirely with Xpress,
with no parallel processing in the enumeration.
C. Testing on IEEE Two-Area Reliability Test System Grid
Table III presents test results on RTS for a number of sce-
narios that differ by the total amount of attack resource , and
the number of recovery HVTs . Any component of the listed
types may be interdicted. Column three shows the number of
lines, individual HVTs, buses and substations that are attacked
in that row’s solution. Column four, “Load shed,” measures
total unserved demand for electricity in GWh. This value is a
surrogate for the true objective, which penalizes load shedding
heavily compared to generating cost.
The defender enjoys increasing benet as increases to 3 or
4, depending on the case, but beyond those values no additional
TABLE IV
COMPUTATIONAL RESULTS FOR USRG
benet accrues. For example, when and reaches 4,
the attacker shifts from attacking substations, which do contain
HVTs, to attacking individual buses only: more spares cannot
help then. On the other hand, when and , the
attacker continues to interdict two substations, even though re-
covery spares quickly replace key, disabled HVTs in those sub-
stations: the attacker must be satisedwith the disruption caused
before recovery spares replace those HVTs. Wiring and load are
crucial here, because replacing two of four disabled HVTs in ei-
ther substation brings the substation back to full functionality.
These results suggest that no simple, heuristic rules will consis-
tently identify an optimal recovery-spare inventory.
D. Testing on U.S. Regional Grid
Table IV displays results for USRG assuming . We
test only Algorithms 4 and 5, as explained under Table II. Given
the values for and the large number of substations, the at-
tacker will interdict exactly ve substations.
Algorithm 4 solves the baseline, no-spares case for USRG to
within 1% of optimality in 2.30 h. We cannot solve a model in-
stance that include all types of spares and all transformers
in less than 24 h, however. To reduce solution times in prac-
tice, we apply a heuristic criterion to reduce the attacker’s po-
tential target set: 1) a substation is deemed “vulnerable to at-
tack” if it appears in the most disruptive interdiction plans
observed while solving the baseline case. For , this cri-
terion gives vulnerable substations, and for
it gives . However, to create a more computationally
challenging test, we add a second criterion for : 2) a
substation is also deemed vulnerable if its total transformer ca-
pacity exceeds 4 GW. This produces , with 64 substa-
tions having spare-replaceable HVTs. The total number of these
HVTs is 116, with up to four in any substation.
The numbers above may seem modest, but an attacker inter-
dicting exactly ve of 74 substations still has over 16 million
choices. And even the most-restrictive selection criterion ap-
pears to be a good one, because 1) near-optimal interdiction
plans for and are identical in all cases, 2)
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TABLE V
MAXIMALLY USEFUL INVENTORIES OF RECOVERY HVTS FOR USRG
solutions only target substations with spare-replaceable HVTs,
3) for , the unrestricted problem
(i.e., all substations are vulnerable) yields a solution within 5%
of optimality (in about 50 h) that is identical to the restricted
problem’s solution, and because 4) sufciently large inventories
of recovery spares in the restricted model lead to the solution
obtained from the unrestricted model given
. (We simulate the last case by using a xed re-
placement time for each HVT of 240 h.) Table IV shows load-
shedding results for USRG that are qualitatively similar to the
results for RTS: a small inventory of recovery HVTs reduces
load-shedding signicantly, but no additional benet accrues
after modest, “maximally useful inventory levels” are reached.
Those levels are , here. (Results
for the unrestricted problem, reported in the last row of Table IV,
corroborate this.) Table V gives details on the worst-case attack
when and . These details
make the point more starkly: total cost after a worst-case attack
does not improve by increasing the inventory of recovery HVTs
beyond four, but that attack disables HVTs.
While it is certainly possible for an optimal inventory
of spares to exceed the number required to recover from a
worst-case attack, this does not happen here. In fact, the single
type-5 recovery spare used appears in an interdicted substation
that also contains a higher-voltage type-2 HVT. Thus, it appears
that, for USRG, the spare-replaceable HVTs that handle the
highest voltages are the critical ones.
In summary, we see that, given assumed component-replace-
ment times, relatively small inventories of recovery HVTs serve
to protect USRG optimally against a comparatively severe at-
tack. Naturally, other transmission grids might prove to be less
robust, and a more detailed study should be executed before im-
plementing any model-based recommendations.
As a nal point on the USRG tests, we wish to note that Al-
gorithm 5 shows more promise than the reported solution times
indicate. This algorithm, which solves its master problem by
enumeration, is substantially faster than Algorithm 4 in some
cases, yet is slower in others. But, we have programmed the enu-
meration using Xpress’s algebraic modeling language Mosel,
which is a scripting language not intended for intensive numer-
ical calculations. Preliminary tests show that a C++ implemen-
tation would reduce the listed solution times listed by at least
half. Furthermore, simple enumeration executes easily on par-
allel processers, and this should reduce solution times further.
Less promising are the extra iterations that Algorithm 5 requires
compared to Algorithm 4. This issue requires further study.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper has described an attacker-defender (AD) model
for an electric power transmission grid that maintains an in-
ventory of high-voltage transformers (HVTs) for quick replace-
ment; these are special “recovery transformers” or “recovery
spares.” Solutions of this model could help guide the related
inventory policy for a utility company or a group of utility com-
panies facing an adversarial threat. For example, results for a
realistic problem show that small inventories of recovery spares
for only two HVT types sufce to protect the grid as best pos-
sible, even though much larger numbers of those types could be
disabled in a worst-case attack.
The new AD model extends earlier work that asserts a xed
repair time for each disabled grid component. A solution opti-
mally assigns a given inventory of recovery spares to minimize
total cost, measured as generating cost plus economic cost for
load shedding. A deterministic replacement time applies to any
piece of equipment that requires new procurement or for which
spares exist in large numbers.
GLBD solves the AD model. Given a coordinated attack on
a set of components, a mixed-integer subproblem within GLBD
optimizes assignments of recovery spares using an implicit eval-
uation of a set of standard optimal power ows for every pos-
sible assignment. We note that the technique could be applied
to other major equipment with limited numbers of spares.
Successful solution of realistic model instances depends on
several new algorithmic techniques. The fastest algorithms
screen a potential interdiction plan for non-optimality by par-
tially enumerating assignments of spares and comparing results
against the incumbent plan. If non-optimality of the plan is
proven quickly, the algorithm generates a solution-elimination
constraint and a valid inequality (i.e., an “approximate cut”) for
the master problem. If not, branch and bound solves the sub-
problem to completion and generates a standard cut. Another
promising technique is the enumeration of feasible interdiction
plans to solve the decomposition’s master problem. Even an
implementation in a scripting language reduces solution times
substantially for some model instances.
APPENDIX
SPARE HVTS FOR ATTACKS AND NATURAL DISASTERS
Based on OPF-T , this Appendix outlines a model for an-
alyzing the value of an inventory of recovery HVTs to improve
the expected response of a transmission grid to both deliberate
attacks and probabilistically modeled natural disasters such as
hurricanes. We assume that a simulation (e.g., [29], [30]) has
identied a nite set of natural-disaster damage scenarios, along
with their probabilities of occurrence.
This article has been accepted for inclusion in a future issue of this journal. Content is final as presented, with the exception of pagination.
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Additional notation:
natural-disaster scenarios;
damaged equipment for scenario if
component is disabled in scenario , and 0 otherwise;
probability that damage scenario occurs during a
given year;
probability that an attack occurs during a given year
(see [3]);
inventory of spare parts (e.g., as
in Section V-D);
same as , but with added to emphasize inventory;
expected total cost, with inventory vector noted.
Because attacks and natural disasters are “low-frequency
events” [31], we assume that all such events are mutually
exclusive. Also, for clarity, we have added explicit notation to
represent the inventory of spares. The new model, measuring
expected total cost per year, has the following form:
(24)
The rst term in (24) uses PFI, as described in the body of the
paper, to evaluate the expected, yearly, total cost associated with
attacks. The second term uses PFI’s subroblem OPF-T to
evaluate the analogous cost for natural disasters. A discounted,
expected total cost could be computed for a range of values of
and an appropriate inventory selected. We note that, in the
course of solving PFI, our decomposition algorithms often com-
pute for more than a thousand “attack damage scenarios”
. Thus, evaluating a thousand or more random damage sce-
narios to calculate the second term in (24) should pose no
computational difculties.
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